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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries arising out 
of an alleged professional medical malpractice committed upon 
plaintiff, Ralph Conk by the defendant, Dr. Wallace Chambers, 
during the course of their professional relationship. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and 
judgment for the defendant, and the trial court's failure to 
grant plaintiff's Motion for New Trial, plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment and 
judgment in his favor as a matter of law as to defendant's 
negligence with the case remanded for a trial on the issues 
of causation and damages only, or that failing, a new trial 
on all issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Ralph Conk, plaintiff herein, was a patient of 
defendant Dr. Wallace Chambers, a board certified general surgeon 
at the Granger Medical Clinic. (R. 162-165) He had been treated 
by various doctors at the clinic over the years for various 
minor maladies, but primarily for high blood pressure and 
obesity. (See testimony of Drs. Lavere D. Poulsen and Jerry 
K. Poulsen. R. 1104-1141) Because of those continuing 
problems, plaintiff first went to Dr. Chambers on March 28, 1973, 
requesting surgical help and advice. The doctor recommended 
that Mr. Conk undergo an operative procedure wherein certain 
portions of his small intestine would be bypassed to decrease 
-1-
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L 
its absorptive capabilities thereby effecutating substantia; 
weight reduction. (R, 780-783) • That operation was performea 
on Mr. Conk at the Valley West Hospital on April 23, 1973. 
(R. 800) 
According to the defendant, Mr. Conk "had an excel! 
operative and post-operative course" (R. 1173.) Also accorc. 
to the doctor, up to February 17, 1975, they had achieved 
the "results contemplated or hoped for, at least, by the sm~ 
(R. 1160) 
However, again by the testimony of the defendant, 
by March 1975, a significant change in Mr. conk's kidney 
function was noted. (R. 1169-1170) At that time Dr. Chambt: 
patient was referred to other specialists who followed his 
condition. Ultimately his kidneys completely shut down. 
(R. 1171, 1010-1015) 
Since the time of the total kidney failure in 1915, 
Mr. Conk has had one unsuccessful attempt at a kidney transpL 
He has been put to the necessity of being attached to an 
artificial kidney machine three times per week for periods 
of five hours for each session. He has had many assorted 
physicial difficulties directly associated with the loss ~ 
his kidneys. He can no longer be gainfully employed and is 
currently on a disability retirement from his job as a draft:· 
for the U.S. Government. (R. 1016-1026) 
It was the position of plaintiff at trial that t~ 
d · · ster" medical treatment by Dr. Chambers was negligently a mini • 
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More particularly, plaintiff alleged that the doctor was 
negligent in that he knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care 
he should have known that the performance of the ileal bypass 
involved extraordinary, unusual and medically unacceptable 
risks to his patient's health and well-being. Specifically, 
the doctor failed and neglected to advise plaintiff of the nature 
and seriousness of the risks associated with the operation, 
that the plaintiff had a pre-existing kidney condition that 
would contraindicate performance of the operation, and that 
the operation itself was experimental in nature. Therefore, 
the doctor did not obtain the requisite informed consent for 
the performance of the operation. 
Plaintiff further asserted that the operation 
should never have been performed because Mr. Conk was not a 
proper candidate due to his prior kidney damage of which 
Mr. Conk had no knowledge. It was also alleged that the 
follow-up care and treatment 'administered by the defendant was 
substandard in that necessary tests were not conducted and 
adequate monitoring of plaintiff's condition, which was not 
done, would have revealed the deteriorating kidneys at a time 
when their function could have been saved or at least the 
damage minimized. (Citation of the facts and reference to the 
record concerning the above is made where appropriate 
Arguments that follow the Statement of Facts) 
At the conclusion of the evidence, plaintiff 
motions for directed verdict on 
statute of limitations and lack of informed consent. Bo 
-3-
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of the motions were denied. (R. 1369-1374). 
The trial court submitted the case to the jury 
by instructing them on the above two issues as well as "conunur.i 
standard of care." Following an adverse jury verdict and 
judgment, plaintiff filed his Motion For New Trial (R. 18Hi: 
and Memorandum In Support Of Motion For New Trial (R. 196-li 
which motion was denied. 
This appeal is taken because the trial court commit•' 
prejudicial error in not granting plaintiff's motions for 
directed verdict, in erroneously instructing the jury, and 
in failing to grant plaintiff's Motion For New Trial. 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN PRESENTING ITS INSTRUCTIONS 
24 AND 25 TO THE JURY AS THEY DO NOT REFLECT THE PROPER 
STANDARD AS TO THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS THAT APPLIES TO 
A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE. 
For the convenience of the Court we set forth 
hereunder the trial Court's Instructions 24 and 25 (R.163 and 
164) . 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
As an affirmative defense, defendants contend this 
action is barred by the statute of limitations. 
Defendants have the burden of proving this defense by 
a preponderance of the evidence. 
The statute of limitations requires that any action 
brought against a physician for an injury must be 
commenced within two years after the date of the 
injury or two years after the patient discovers, 
or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
should have discovered the injury, whichever occurs 
later. You must determine from the evidence when 
the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered 
his injury. 
If the plaintiff became aware of facts that, under 
the circumstances, would have alerted an ordinary 
and prudent person to the possibility that some 
unexpected harm may have been caused by the surgery, 
then he is also deemed to have discovered the 
injury on that date. The plaintiff is charged with 
the responsibility of making inquiries upon learning 
of the possibility of harm and he is deemed to know 
everything that such an inquiry might have revealed 
concerning the injury and the cause of such injury. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
For purposes of applying the statute of limitations, 
the plaintiff is deemed to have discovered his injury 
when he first became aware of any unexpected and 
harmful consequences that he knew, or upon reasonable 
inquiry should have known, were caused by the surgery 
Dr. Chambers performed. It is not required that 
the plaintiff was able to ascertain or comprehend 
the full extent or nature of his injury at that time, 
nor is it necessary that he knew, or could have known, 
that the injury was caused by negligence of Dr. Chambers 
-5-
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It is sufficient if plaintiff knew, or by the use of 
reasonable diligence could have learned, that the 
injury was the result of the surgery. 
With these principles to guide you, if you find fro 
a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff r. 
discovered or through the use of reasonable diligen~;' 
should have discovered any injury before July 29, · 
1974, then you must return a verdict in favor of 
the defendants. 
Plaintiff first made a motion for a directed 
verdict as to the statute of limitations at the conclusion 
of the evidence and then took exception to the legal stand~& 
expressed in the trial court's instructions at the appropria~ 
time during the trial (R.1338 and 1339). Plaintiff further 
brought these matters to the attention of the trial court in 
his Motion for New Trial and in his Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for New Trial (R.200 202). 
A. HISTORY OF LIMITATION OF ACTIONS STATUTES IN 
CASES OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. 
Medical malpractice cases at common law were 
classified in the general category of negligence or tort 
actions. Therefore, until special legislation began being~~ 
in various jurisdictions throughout the country, the general 
negligence limitation of action statutes applied. Utah's 
general statute found in Section 78-12-1 U.C.A., 1953, which 
is similar to most such sections throughout the country, state; 
in pertinent part: 
"Civil actions can be commenced only within 
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the 
cause of action shall have accrued, . 
· t d the "accrual' The common law rule harshly interpre e 
date as being the moment of the defendant's neglect. ~ 
-6-
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v. Crowell, 247 S.E.2d 287 (N.C. 1978) at 293. 
In the 1930's exceptions to the common law limitation 
began surfacing to ameliorate the inequities of such a harsh 
rule. The first exception that gained popular acceptance is 
known as the "continued course of treatment rule." The 
theory is basically that a Fiduciary relationship of trust 
exists between a patient and doctor which if broken could result 
in more serious consequences than the act of malpractice itself 
may cause. An illustrative case is that of Borgia v. City 
of New York, 187 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y. 1962). At 187 N.E.2d 
779 the court explained the principle of continuing treatment 
tolling the statute of limitations by placing the theory in the 
context of the facts of the case that was before the court. 
Little argument is needed to prove the proposition 
that the "continuous treatment" therory is the 
fairer one. It would be absurd to require a 
wronged patient to interrupt corrective efforts 
by serving a summons on the physician or hospital 
superintendent or by filing a notice of claim in 
the case of a city hospital. The case now under 
review will illustrate. This child by reason of 
the hospital personnel's negligence suffered 
permanent brain damage at the hospital on the 
night he was admitted and on three later 
occasions was a victim of neglect amounting to 
malpractice. Acceptance by us of the city's 
argument that the 90 days ran from the last mal~ 
practice would mean that, if the child had :emained 
in the hospital a few days longer than he did, t~e 
90-day period would have expired while he was still 
a patient receiving care and treatm~nt related to 
the conditions produced by the earlier wrongful 
acts and omissions of defendant's employees. 
we are warned of dire results from this holding. 
Patients, we are told, will use this decis~on to 
justify suits brought years later. But this 
assumes that, so long as a patient c?ntinue~ to 
consult the same physician for any kind of illness, 
-7-
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the time to sue as to any kind of malpractice will 
never start to run. We are creating no such 
situation. The "continuous treatment" we mean is 
treatment for the same or related illnesses or 
injuries, continuing after the alleged 
acts of malpractice, not mere continuity of a 
general physician-patient relationship. 
The Utah Supreme Court very early in the trend t~~ 
liberializing the severity of the common law rule adopted a 
continuing course of treatment rule. In the case of Peteler 
v. Robison, 17 P. 2d 244 (Utah 1932), defendant was an eye, ear 
nose, and throat specialist who allegedly performed an 
unnecessary tonsilectomy, and gave improper follow-up 
care and treatment which resulted in severe infection which 
spread to both ears requiring surgical care and tr~atment. ~ 
plaintiff was under the care and treatment of the doctor 
seeing him on a regular basis from January 16, 1919, 
to and including October 22, 1926. The defendant demurredw~ 
the trial court sustaining the demurrer on the ground that 
the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitatiom 
for failure to file within four years after the cause of 
action accrued. The action was filed January 24, 1927. 
Defendant took the position the cause accrued January 18, 
1919 when the alleged misdiagnosis took place. 
The Court explained its reversal of the trial court 
in the following language: 
Had we a case where the only negligence alledged 
was the negligent and unskillful operation i~ 
removing the tonsils, and nothing more, let it 
be assumed that the cause of action accrued at 
the time of the commission and completion of such 
-8-
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operation, and, if an action based on such negligence 
alone was not commenced within four years there-
after, the bar of the.statute would be complete, 
though the consequential damages or injuries 
resulting from such negligence were not ascertained 
or made manifest until after the statute had run. 
But that is not the alleged cause of action. 
Here the defendant undertook to treat the plaintiff 
for a throat affliction. From the time he undertook 
to treat the case until he ceased to treat it he, 
as alleged, did so in a negligent and unskillful 
manner. As alleged, the treatments were not 
separate and distinct acts, separate and distinct 
causes of action. They constituted an entire 
course of treatment of a case undertaken by 
defendant to be treated by him, and the whole 
thereof constituted but one cause of action. 
From the averments of the complaint, we think it 
should here be said, that the tort was a 
continuing one, and, where the tort is continuing, 
the right of action is also continuing. (17 P2d. 
at 249) (Citations Omitted). 
In addition to the continuing tort theory the Court 
further discussed allegations of fraudulent concealment based 
upon representations of the defenant that his care and treatment 
would correct the problems in time and that she was suffering 
from the natural consequences of the operation. Defendant 
countered that such representations were mere expressions of 
opinion and not sufficient to show fraud. The Court implied 
that there is a different standard of fraud when the doctor 
patient relationship exists not entirely unlike the later 
decision in Ballenger, supra. 
(T)he case is not one of an alleged tort 
or breach where the parties stood on an equality and 
dealt with each other at arm's length, or where 
each had equal means of knowledge. The relation 
of the parties being that of physician and patient, 
the case is one of trust and confidence imposed 
in the defendant, and, as to what was to be done and 
what was being done and as to the manner ~f treatment, 
the plaintiff had the right to rely and did rely 
upon the superior knowledge of the defendant. 
-9-
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The necessity, purpose, and good faith of the 
continued treatments were facts peculiarly within 
the knowledge of the defendant. While the alleged 
assurances of the defendant, that the continued 
treatments would eventually clear up and cure the 
throat conditions, were in the nature of an opini~ 
and for that reason not subject as a basis of an ' 
action for failure to accomplish such results, Still 
the promises and assurances were pertinent and 
relevant as bearing on the confidence and relian~ 
placed in the defendant, on the acts and conduct of 
the plaintiff in submitting to the continued 
treatments and as to her delay of enforcing wha~v~ 
right to a cause of action was possessed by her, ~, 
if the defendant by his continued treatments was 
able to accomplish what he represented and assured 
he was able to do and the representations believed• 
relied on by plaintiff, the natural effect of su~ 
representations until the falsity of them was 
discovered was to cause delay in the enforcement 
of whatever right was possessed by the plait~ff . 
17 P2d at 250 (Emphasis Added). (See Fowles v. Pennsylvania 
Ry, 264 F2d 399 (1959) putting the continuing tort theory in 
the context of a Federal Employers Liability Act case). 
In the years that followed, many jurisdictions adopt1 
the termination of treatment theory as the date of "accrual" 
of the cause of action. A relatively early California case 
faced the issue of whether or not the "termiation of 
treatment" theory was to apply in a situation where a specifi: 
statute limited the cause of action. Myers v. Stevenson, 270 
P2d. 885 (Cal. 1954). Therein, the Court was faced with 
an alleged malpractice by a physician committed on a minor 
during the course of the mother's labor. The suit was filed 
more than six years after the child's birth. The Court was 
asked to consider the applicability of California's six year 
statute governing torts committed upon children conceived, but 
not yet born. The statute specifically stated that there 
would be no tolling of the six year limitation during any ~~· 
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disability mentioned in another section of the code that 
provided for tolling during periods of minority, insanity, and 
other disabilities. (It should be noted that this aspect is 
very similar to our current malpractice limitation of Section 
78-14-4 U.C.A., 1953 as amended, infra.) 
The Court found that there would be a tolling of 
the statute during the continuing treatment because the six 
year limitation was procedural in natute just as limitation of 
actions statutes are on any right that had its origin at common 
law as opposed to having its origin in legislative enactment 
and therefore: 
If a statute specifies one exception to a general rule 
* * *other exceptions * * *are excluded." 
Having expressly provided that the disabilities 
mentioned in Code Civ.Proc. § 352, i. e. infancy, 
insanity, etc., shall not extend the statute the 
legislature under this rule, as plainly indicated 
that other recognized legal grounds for extending the 
statute should be operative. 
We conclude that the time limitation contained in 
section 29 was intended by the legislature as a 
procedural statute of limitations subject to being 
extended by any legal ground not specificall.y 
excluded in the section itself. 
270 P2d. at 890 (Citations Omitted). (Emphasis Added). 
That, of course is the status of the medical mal-
practice limitation that currently exists in Utah in that it 
has certain specifically excluded items leaving other legal 
grounds subject to court determination. 
The Myers case also was an early decision further 
ameliorating the burden on plaintiffs by judicially invoking 
the rule "that the statute of limitation only starts to run 
from the date of discovery of, or the date when by the exercise 
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of reasonable diligence the plaintiff should have discovered 
the wrongful act." 270 P2d at 887. The Court used the 
"discovery rule" and the "termination of treatment rule" 
together in reversing the judgment of the lower court. 
The Utah Supreme Court was again confronted with 
the definition of when a malpractice cause of action "accrues 
in the case of Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P2d 435 (Utah 196s). 
Again, it should be recalled this case predated the passage 
of specific legislation limiting the period of time during 
which a malpractice claim could be filed. In the Christi~~ 
case the evidence showed that a foreign object, to-wit: 
a surgical needle, had been left in the body of the Plaintiff 
an operation; that Plaintiff had been ignorant of that factt 
ensuing period of time; that 10 years after the surgical proci! 
had been performed, but within four years after Plaintiff h~ 
discovered the existence of the surgical needle in his body,:, 
tiff filed a malpractice action. The Trial Court granted ~~ 
Motion for Summary Judgment. On appeal the question was whet' 
Utah would adopt the so-called "discovery rule" or whetherOO 
would rule that regardless of the Plaintiff's lack of knowlec: 
of the existence of the foreign object in his body, the St~~ 
of Limitations commenced to run at the time of perforrnanceo' 
the operation. In a four to one decision, Justice Callist~ 
made the following statement in support of the "discovery 
rule": 
Case authority is divided as to the proper 
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rule in cases such as this. It would serve no 
useful purpose to discuss these divergent opinions. 
Suffice it to sa , this court has read and 
ana yze them an as reac e t e cone usion that 
logic and reason support those authorities which 
have adopted the discover¥ rule. It seems some-
what incongruous that an injurea person must commence 
a malpractice action prior to the time he knew, or 
reasonably should have known, of his injur~ and 
right of action. It seems apparent that a herence to 
the 'majority rule' would penalize the conscientious 
doctor, who would advise his patient of a mistake, 
and protect a practitioner, who would not reveal 
his mistake until the statute of limitations became 
a shield. 
Therefore, we now hold that, regardless of 
prior pronouncements, where a foreign object is 
negligently left in the body of a patient during 
an operation and the patient is ignorant of the 
fact, and consequently of his right of action for 
malpractice, the cause of action does not accrue 
until the patient learned of the resence of such 
oreign obJect in his bo y. Emphasis ad e 
The Court in arriving at its opinion cites with 
approval a number of cases, some of which are of particular 
importance. 
The first of these cases is that of Berry v. Bran~, 
421 P.2d 966 (Ore. 1966). In the Berry case the Plaintiff 
brought a malpractice action against a physician. The Trial 
Court entered judgment adverse to the patient. The patient 
appealed and the Supreme Court in a five-two decision reversed, 
holding that the cause of action for malpractice action "accrues" 
within the meaning of the applicable two-year statute of limitations 
when the patient obtains " ••• knowledge, or reasonably should 
have obtained knowledge of a tort committed on the patient's 
-13-
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person by the physician." The facts of the case were that 
Defendant, in performing a hysterectomy upon the Plaintiff, 
had left a surgical needle in her abdomen and the existen~ 
of the surgical needle in her abdomen was not discovered until 
nine years later. The cause of action was filed within two 
years of the discovery. The relevant statute reads as 
follows: 
"Actions at law shall only be commenced within 
the period prescribed in this chapter, after 
the cause of action shall have accrued, 
(Emphasis added) 
The Court, after noting that the "present ,controver: 
revolves around the meaning of the word 'accrued', "had the 
following to say in support of its opinion: 
"To say that a cause of action accrues to a 
person when she may maintain an action thereon 
and, at the same time, that it accrues before 
she has or can reasonably be expected to have 
knowledge of any wrong inflicted upon her is 
patently inconsistent and unrealistic. She cannot 
maintain an action before she knows she has one. 
To say to one who has been wrongea, ~you had a 
remedy, but before the wrong was ascertainable 
to you, the law stripped you of your remedy, 
makes a mockery of the law. In the absence of an 
expressed statutory direction to the effect, to 
ascribe to the legislature any such intention by 
their use of the word 'accrue' seems to us 
unreasonable." 
And, again: 
"We do not believe the legislature intended to 
limit patients asserting malpractice claims, who 
by the very nature of the treatment had no way 
of immediately ascertaining their injury, to 
-14-
-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the same overall period of time that is allowed 
~or b~inging other tort actions that are normally 
immediately ascertainable upon commission of 
the wrong. The protection of the medical pro-
fession from stale claims does not require such 
a harsh rule." 
And, finally, in support of its opinion, the Court states: 
"It is the opinion of this court that the cause 
of action accrued at the time plaintiff obtained 
knowledge, or reasonably should have obtained 
knowledge of the tort committed upon her person 
by defendant. The case of Vaughn v. Langmack is 
overruled." (Citations Omitted) 
Another case cited with approval by the Utah Court in 
the Christiansen case is Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hospital, et al. 
417 P2d. 469 (Mont. 1966). In the Johnson case, Plaintiff brought 
an action against the doctor and hospital claiming he had recently 
discovered that a sponge had been left in his body in an operation 
perfonned ten years previously. The Trial Court granted summary 
judgment against the patient holding that the Statute of Limitations 
had run against his claim. The case was appealed and reversed. 
The applicable Statut,e of Limitations reads as follows: 
"Within three years: • 
"3. An action upon an obligation or liability, 
not founded upon an instrument " 
The question again was clearly presented as to whether 
the Statute of Limitations commenced to run at the time of 
the negligent incident or at the time plaintiff discovered 
the negligent incident. The Court in a very erudite 
opinion covers various theories different jurisdictions have 
promulgated to obviate the harshness of the so-called general 
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• 
rule that Statutes of Limi ta ti on run from commission of the r,, 
ligent act. The Court discussed the "continuing negligence tr.' 
the "contract theory," and the "fraudulent concealment theory' 
and then the Court in summary had the following to say: 
"All of these exceptions to the so-called 
'general rule' which respondents want this 
court to follow illustrate that in reality 
the 'general rule' has little to recommend 
it. Courts out of necessity have tried to 
make exceptions in order to do justice. We 
confronted with the problem presented by the 
facts of this case had adopted the best rea-
soned rule, which we adopt and will follow. 
It is: 'Where a foreign object is negligently 
left in a patient's body by a surgeon and the 
patient is in ignorance of the fact, and, con-
sequently of his right of action for mal-
practice, the cause of action does not accrue 
until the patient learns of, or in exercise of 
reasonable care and diligence should have 
learned of the presence of such foreign object 
in his body.' (Citations Omitted) 
Another case cited by the Utah Court in Christianse: 
to which we call the Court's attention is Billings v. Sisters 
Mercy of Idaho, et al., 389 P.2d. 224 (Idaho 1964). In the~ 
case, Plaintiff brought an action for malpractice alleging & 
a gauze sponge had been left in her body during an operatioor 
formed in 1948, which was not discovered until an explora~ey 
operation was performed in 1961. The case was filed withinb 
years of discovery of the sponge. The applicable Statute of 
Limitations reads as follows: 
"Civil actions can only be commenced within 
the periods prescribed in this chapter after the 
cause of action shall have accrued, • . " 
The Trial Court dismissed the Complaint on the gro~ 
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that the cause of action was barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
The case was appealed and reversed by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Defendant claimed that the cause of action accrued at the time 
the sponge was left in her body. Once again we have a Court 
covering the entire Statute of Limitations problem as it pertains 
to the "discovery" rule. Discussing once again the "contract rule," 
the "continuing negligence rule," the "fraudulent concealment rule" 
and so on, the Court states: 
"Of course, when a plaintiff is run down by an 
automobile, it is clear that his cause of action will 
accrue on that date. This is not only because he 
has a right to sue, but also because he can use 
judicial process to secure enforcement of that 
right. Where a surgeon negligently leaves a , 
sponge in the body of a plaintiff, while the plain-
tiff might possess some potential right to sue, he 
has no means of developing that right, or acting 
upon it until he is able to discover the negligence 
of the surgeon. It is more logical to follow the 
reasoning stated in Note, Developments in the 
Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 Har.L.Rev. 1177 at 
1205 (1950), as follows, '* * * the "cause of 
action' which commences the limitations period 
should not refer to the 'technical' breach of 
duty which determines whether the plaintiff has 
any legal right, but to the existence of a 
practical remedy." (Emphasis added) 
And, again, the Court states: 
"Indeed, it appears that most jurisdictions, when , 
faced with the set of facts we have presented herein 
would, on one theory or another, allow appellants 
to come into court and present their claims." 
And in conclusion, the Court makes the statement which is quoted 
with approval in Christiansen: 
"In reality, the 'general rule' has little to 
commend it. It is neither the position of a 
majority of the jurisdictions nor is,it ~irmly 
based on consideraions of reason or Justice. 
-17-
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We will, therfore, adhere to the following rule" 
where a foreign object is negligently left in a 
patient's body by a surgeon and the patient is in 
ignorance of the fact, and consequently of his 
right of action for malpractice, the cause of 
action does not accrue until the patient learns 
of, or in the exercise of reasonable care and 
diligence should have learned of the presence 
of such foreign object in his body. (Citations ~~~ 
Some argued the proposition that the "discovered, 
or should by the exercise of reasonable care have discovered" 
rule applied only to cases where foreign objects are left in 
the bodies of persons during operative procedures and does ~ 
extend to other cases. Such a contention was not support~~ 
by the Christiansen case, by simple logic, or by authorities 
from other states. Again, we refer to the Christiansen langua· 
"It seems somewhat incongruous that an injured 
person must commence a malpractice action prior 
to the time he knew, or reasonably should have 
known, of his injury and right of action." 
(Emphasis Added) 
And then in a footnote, the Court quotes from the case of Ros" 
v. Senger, (1944) 149 P.2d 372: 
"It is ..• an ancient maxim of the common law 
that 'Where there is a right there is a remedy.' 
What a mockery to say to one, grievously wronged, 
'Certainly you had a remedy, but while your 
debtor concealed from you the fact that you had 
a right, the law stripped you of your remedy.'" 
A case directly in point demonstrates "foreign body' 
is only one aspect of the "discovery" doctrine. That case 
dealt with a misdiagnosis. In the case of Yoshizaki v. 
Hilo Hospital, 433 P2d. 220 (Hawaii 1967) plaintiff filed a 
medical malpractice action. The question was whether the 
"discovery doctrine" should be applied or whether the har~ 
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doctrine that the Statute of Limitations began to run at the 
time of the negligent act should be applied. Plaintiff had alleged 
that Defendant hospital, through one of its doctors, negligently 
diagnosed the plaintiff's neck ailment as cancer. The doctor 
recommended radiation treatment of the "cancer". The plaintiff 
was treated at another hospital where, as a result of negligence 
by an employee of the other hospital, the plaintiff received 
radiation burns. The narrow question upon which the case turned, 
as stated by the Court, was as follows: 
"IVhen does the statute of limitation begin to run 
against a malpractice claim where the plaintiff 
did not know, nor acting reasonably could have been 
expected to know, that the defendant had negligently 
diagnosed an ailment?" 
The claim was made in Yoshizaki that the "discovery" 
rule should be limited to foreign object cases and should 
not apply to a broad~r range of cases. The Court stated: 
"We conclude that the statute does not begain 
to run until the plaintiff knew or should have 
known of the defendant's negligence. This con-
clusion is consistent with the legislative pre-
scription to avoid constructions which would lead 
to absurd results. The injustice of barring the 
plaintiff's action before she could reasonably 
have been aware that she had a claim is patent. 
A basic reason underlying statutes of limitation 
is nonexistent; the plaintiff has not delayed 
voluntarily in asserting her claim. We realize 
that added burdens are placed on defendants by 
forcing them to defend claims with evidence that 
may be stale. We should not overlook the fact that 
the plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient 
to establish a prima facie case before the 
defendant is obliged to produce any evidence. 
A few courts appear to have limited the dis-
covery doctrine to cases in which the de~en~ant 
has left a foreign object inside the plaintiff 
in order to reduce the possibility that the 
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plaintiff is asserting a completely fraudulent 
claim. (cases cited) We reject the distinction. 
In some cases, especially those involving an 
allegedly negligent diagnosis, a physical object 
is not involved proof becomes more difficult. 
This does not necessarily mean that a fraudulent 
claim may be more easily asserted. As in the 
instant case, treatment generally follows diag-
nosis. The treatment is an objective fact which 
may be proved or disproved by people other than 
the plaintiff. The fact that the treatment is 
the kind normally administered for the ailment the 
doctor allegedly improperly diagnosed is strong 
evidence of the diagnosis. 
We concluded that the conflicting policies are 
best reconciled by permitting the plaintiff the 
opportunity to prove that she neither knew nor 
could reasonably have been expected to know of the 
defendant's alleged negligence until the date 
alleged in her complaint. If the legislature 
deems our reconcilliation of these conflicting 
policies incorrect or wishes to place an outside 
limit on the time for bringing a malpractice 
action, it is free to do so. Until that time, 
however, we will not deny a plaintiff access 
to our courts for failure to assert such a 
claim if he asserts it within two years after 
he actually or constructively discovered it." 
A later Idaho case applied the rule of law expres~ 
in Billings, supra, to a misdiagnosis case. We cite Renner~ 
Edwards, 475 P2d. 530, (Ida. 1979). The Renner case in-
volved a misdiagnosis which resulted in Colostomy surgery bei: 
performed on March 21, 1961. For three years thereafter Plai: 
suffered other problems including pain and inability to cooW 
normal body functions. On July 15, 1964, corrective surgery'' 
performed revealing the misdiagnosis and a suit was filed wit:-
two years of the discovery of said misdiagnosis. The Court~ 
in favor of Plaintiff and stated: 
"It would, in our opinion, be manifestly , 
unjust to bar the enforcement of injury claims 
brought by a plaintiff who was not, nor co~ld n~ 
have known that he was the victim of tortious 
' ble conduct because the consequent harm was unknowa 
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within two years of the negligent act. In this 
age o~ enlightened medicine and highly sophisticated 
curative treatment, it is very likely that the 
maturation of injury resulting from negligent treat-
ment would not evidence itself for well after the 
tw? years provided for in the statute of limitations. 
This thought becomes particularly disturbing when 
one realizes that the latent injuries arising from 
medical malpractice would very likely go undetected by 
the victim as only trained and skillful practitioners 
of medicine could ascertain whether a patient has 
been mistreated. Even the physical symptoms which 
might herald future inquiry may well be beyond the 
comprehension or perception of the average layman." 
Later, on the same page, the Court continues: 
"To require a man to seek a remedy before he knows 
of his rights is probably unjust. Under such circum-
stances, in order for a patient to secure and pro-
tect his legal rights against doctors for malpractice, 
the patient would be required to submit himself to 
complete examinations by a series of independent phy-
sicians after every operation or treatment he received 
from the physician of his first choice. The unrea-
sonableness of such a result is self-evident." 
(Emphasis added) 
See also for a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals interpreta-
tion of Idaho law suppcirting the "Discovery" rule in a 
negligent diagnosis situation the case of Owens v. White, 
et al. (9 CCA 1965) 342 F2d. 817. 
Another negligent diagnosis case is Hungerford v. U.S. 
(9 CCA 1962) 307 F2d. 99. The Hungerford case is a Federal Tort 
Claims Act case. A soldier wounded in July, 1950, in Korea was 
misdiagnosed as having a psychosomatic condition, when, in fact, he 
1.11 
was suffering from organic brain damage which was correctable by i 'i! 
surgery. The organic brain damage was not discovered until ten years I iii 
later. The action was thereafter filed against the Government. The 11; ! 
Government claimed the Statute of Limitation had run. The Court stat~!ti · 
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" . . The Government had not only the duty to 
communicate to Hungerford a correct diagnosis 
of his condition, but also to render proper care 
for the treatment of the physical condition from 
w~ich he was actual~y suffering. Under the allega-
tions of the Complaint there was a failure to perfur 
this latter duty because of the negligent manner in 
which the examination and diagnostic tests were 
made, or because of the failure to make tests, whlct 
in the exercise of proper care should have been made. 
With regard to the "discovery rule", see also: 
Tomlinson v. Siehl, 459 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970); Hackworth v. 
Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1971); Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 
794 (Del. 1968); Hundley v. St. Francis Hospital, 161 Cal.~~ 
800, 327 P.2d 131 (1958); Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 
123 N.W.2d 785 (1963); Edwards v. Ford, 279 So.2d 851 (Fla. B'; 
Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972); Mayer v. Good Samari: 
Hospital, 14 Ariz.App. 248, 482 P.2d 497 (1971); Owens v. 
Brechner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970); Lipsey v. 
Michael Reese Hospital, 46 Ill.2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970): 
Ruth v. Dight, 183 Neb. 866, 165 N.W.2d 74 (1969); Wilkinson 
v. Harrington, 104 R.I.224, 243 A.2d 745 (1968); Iverson v. 
Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1968); Springer v. Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Co., 169 So.2d 171 (La.App. 1964); 
Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300 (Okl. 1962); Nowell v. Hamiltoo, 
249 N.C. 523, 107 S.E.2d 112 (1959); Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 
267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973); Frohs v. Greene, 253 Or. 1 
452 P.2d 564 (1969); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 
A.2d 825 (1966); Flanagan v. Mount Eden General Hospital, 24 
N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871 (1969); Hungerford, supra;~ 
United States, 438 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1971); Johnson v. 
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United States, 271 F.Supp. 205 (W.D. Ark. 1967); and Quinton 
v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962). 
In 1971 the Utah Statute of limitations was amended 
by adding thereto Section 78-12-28 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
(1975 Pocket Supplement). This section, for the first time 
in Utah codified the "discovery" rule. For convenience of 
the Court we refer to the old general statute, and the sub-
sequent amendments to it. The key language reads as follows: 
"78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions 
generally.--Civil actions can be commenced only 
within the periods prescribed in this chapter, 
after the cause of action shall have accrued, • 
(Emphasis added) 
The 1971 statute reads in pertinent part: 
78-12-28. Within two years: .•. 
(3) An action against a physician and surgeon, 
..• or a licensed hospital ••. for professional 
negligence . . • two years after the date of injury 
or two years after the plaintiff discovers, or 
throught the use'of reasonable diligence, should 
have discovered the injury, whichever occurs 
later, . . . " (Emphasis added) 
The 1976 Legislature made additional changes in the 
limitation of action section of the:"Health Care Malpractice 
Act". Section 78-14-1 et. seq, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Again, in pertinent part that section states: 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations--Exceptions--
Application. -- (l) No malpractice action against 
a health care provider may be brought unless it 
is commenced within two years after the plaintiff 
or patient discovers, or through the use of rea~ 
sonable diligence should have discovered the in]ury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four 
years after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence, ••. 
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It can readily be seen from that language that the 
"discovery" rule pronounced so clearly in Christiansen has 
been reaffirmed by the new statutes. The difference between 
the 1971 and the 1976 statutes is minimal. The key language 
of "discovery of the injury" is the same. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN INSTRUCTION 25 " ... NOR IS IT 
NECESSARY THAT HE KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT THE INJURY 
WAS CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE OF DR. CHAMBERS " 
With the history of statute of limitations in 
medical malpractice actions in mind, it is now appropriate~; 
to the specifics of the case at bar. The court's instructioo 
25 (R.164) misstates the law. The standard the Trial Court 
presented the jury would require an injured patient to file 
his cause of action before he has a resonable opportunity ~ 
discover the necessary elements of a prima facie cause of acti: 
The elements of a prima facie cause of action are physical 
injury plus some act of neglect proximately causing physical 
injury. Instruction 25 would require an individual to file 
a cause of action every time an operation or any medical 
treatment didn't result in a complete recovery whether due 
to the neglect of his physician or not. This would result 
in a great multiplicity of meritless lawsuits which is 
contrary to public policy. 
It is advisable that the definition of "injury" ~ 
examined. It is axiomatic that in determining legislative 
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intent the words in a statute must be interpreted in the light 
of their common meaning. "Injury" is defined in the College 
Edition, Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, 
World Publishing Company, Cleveland and New York, 1960, as follows: 
"1. physical harm or damage to a person, 
property, etc. 2. unjust treatment; violation 
or rights; offense." (Emphasis added) 
An amplification of that definition as it applies to 
the law of torts is contained in the Restatement of Torts II: 
"§ 7. Injury and Harm 
"(1) The word 'injury' is used throughout the 
Restatement of this Subject to denote the invasion 
of any legally protected interest of another. 
(2) The word 'harm' is used throughout the 
Restatement of this Subject to denote the existence 
of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person 
resulting from any cause. 
(3) The words 'physical harm' are used throughout 
the Restatement of this Subject to denote the 
physical impairment of the human body, or of land 
or chattels." (emphasis added) 
It is clear that ·in defining the term "injury" as used 
in the Utah Code, there must be an invasion of a legally protected 
interest. Furthermore, had the legislature intended to say that 
the statute would commence to run from the time of physical harm 
as that term is defined in the Restatement of Torts, it would 
have used the term "physical harm." 
The legally protected interest in this case is not 
the actual physical damage standing alone. Rather, it is the 
emergence of a cause of action sounding in tort at the time when 
Plaintiff discovered or in the exercise of ordinary care should 
have discovered, that his treating physician had breached 
his legal duty to Mr. Conk. 
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The better reasoned case authority supports the 
above propostion. The case of Hunter v. Knight, 571 P2d. 
212 (Wash. 1977) involved the alleged malpractice of an 
accounting firm. The Washington Supreme Court held that the 
statute begins to run only when all of the elements necessary 
to the maintenance of a lawsuit are present. The Court 
said that the "critical point of inquiry" is the later 
event the absence of which makes suit impossibe or improbable, 
In a California case that stood among other thi~s 
for the proposition that the "patient is entitled to rely 
upon the physician's professional skill and judgment while 
under his care, and has little choice but to do so • , II f tho 
Court also made it clear that "Since . (1963), it had been 
clear that the limitations period did not conunence until the 
plaintiff either (1) actually discovered his injury and its 
negligent cause or (2) could have discovered injury and 
cause through the exercise of reasonable diligence." ~ 
v. South Hoover Hospital, 553 P.2d 1129 (Cal. 1976) at 1132. b 
omitted) (Emphasis added). The Court went on to analyze 
the recent California statute which is very similar to the 
current Utah limitation in malpractice cases by stating what 
"injury" means. 
The legislative history to which we previously 
have alluded gives no indication that the drafters 
of section 340.5 either intended to modify the , 
common law "discovery" rule in the foregoing fashion 
or to effect such a change by focusing on the tem 
"injury." In fact, the word "injury" had come , 
to be used in the cases to denote both a person_3. 
hysical condition and its "ne li ent cause." , ~ 
We think that t e Legislature in enacting section , 
intended no more than to adopt the prior "discoveG 
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rule, and that the word "injury" retained, 
context used, the broad meaning the courts 
pr~viously given to it. 553 P2d at 1133. 
omitted) (Emphasis added) 
in the 
had 
(Citations 
The Sanchez court affirmed the trial court's granting 
of summary judgment because the plaintiff had discovered her 
physical injury and the negligent cause therefore more than the 
limitation period prior to filing. 
Frohs v. Greene, 452 P2d 564 (Or. 1969) similarly 
stated the gross inequity that would exist if "injury" 
was to be defined in the narrow terms of the trial court in the 
present case before the Court. 
. • . It is manifestly unrealistic and unfair to 
bar a negligently injured party's cause of action 
before he has had an opportunity to discover that 
it exists. This is true whether the malpractice 
consists of leaving a foreign object in the body or 
whether it consists of faulty diagnosis or treatment. 
The followng language used in Berry v. Branner, 
supra, at page 312, 421 P.2d at page 998, when 
construing the Oregaon statute, is equally appli-
cable to all kinds of malpractice: 
"* * * To say that a cause of action accrues to 
a person when she may maintain an action thereon 
and, at the same time, that it accrues before she 
has or can reasonably be expected to have knowledge 
of any wrong inflicted upon her is patently in-
consistent and unrealistic. She cannot maintain an 
action before she knows she has one. To say to 
one who has been wronged, 'You had a remedy, but 
before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the 
law stripped you of your remedy,' makes a mockery 
of the law. * *·" 
We do not believe that the danger of spurious claims 
is so great as to necessitate the infliction of 
injustice on persons having legitimate claims which 
were undiscoverable by the exercise of ordinary 
care prior to the lapse of two years from the time 
of the act inflictingthe injury. Nor do we 
believe the legislature intended such a resul~. . 
452 P.2d at 565. (Emphasis added) See also Billings 
v. sister of Mercy Hospital, supra. and Renner v. 
Edwards, supra. 
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Just decisions as those noted above are not limited 
to the Western United States. In 1978 the North Carolina Supr; 
Court, in Ballenger v. Crowell, supra in applying its vari~lt 
of the "course of treatment" rule limited by the "discovery 
rule" in a malpractice action against a physician who alleged!: 
caused a patient's narcotic addiction, adopted the following 
language from two other jurisdictions: 
"(THE) limitation period starts to run when the 
patient discovers . . • the negligent act which 
caused his injury." Jones v. Sugar, 305 A.2d at 
223 (Md.) 
"(T)he injury may be readily apparent, but the 
fact of wrong may lay hidden until after the 
prescribed time has passed." Also see Lopez v. Swyer 
supra 300 A.2d at 567. 
New Hampshire likewise has the rule that a 
physically injured individual must "discover" both the 
physical injury as well as wrongful conduct or negligence. 
Brown v. Memorial Hospital, 378 A.2d 1138 (N.H. 1977). 
Justice Maughan writing the opinion for the court 
in the case of Vincent v. s. L. County, 583 P.2d 105 (Utah 
1978) considered an analogous situation. There, a homeowner 
suffered damage to his home from water undermining his 
foundation. He didn't know from where the water was coming 
until after the notice period for the county had run. 
Ultimately the plaintiff found that the county had negligently 
caused the water to run which damaged his home. The court 
approvingly adopted the language from its previous decision 
on malpractice limitations in the Christiansen case supra: 
"It seems somewhat incongruous that an injured 
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person must commence a malpracice action prior to the time he 
knew or reasonably could have known of his injury and right of 
action." (Emphasis added) 
It would seem more than "somewhat" incongruous 
to interpret the legislature's intent in any way other than that 
"injury" equals "physical harm" plus a "legally invaded right." 
To rule otherwise would create a great social evil. This 
court should not say to Ralph Conk, "You had a remedy but 
before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law stripped 
you of your remedy." Frohs v. Greene, supra. 
C. THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS 
INSTRUCTION 24 WHEREIN IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT "IF THE 
PLAINTIFF BECAME AWARE OF FACTS THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, 
WOULD HAVE ALERTED AN ORDINARY AND PRUDENT PERSON TO THE 
POSSIBILITY THAT SOME UNEXPECTED HARM MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY 
THE SURGEON, THEN HE IS ALSO DEEMED TO HAVE DISCOVERED THE 
INJURY ON THAT DATE. I 
For the same reasons that the Court committed error 
in Instruction 25, Instruction 24 is erroneous. This instruction 
assumes that "injury" only relates to physical harm. The 
case authority previously cited demonstrates incongruities and 
missapplication of legislative intent of such a standard. The stand-
ard is not when the ordinary and prudent person would have been 
alerted that some unexpected harm was caused by the surgery, 
but rather when the plaintiff discovered or by reasonable 
diligence he should have discovered his physical harm and 
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the negligent cause of his physical injuries. No further 
case authority need be cited for this position. 
Further, presenting two such instructions to the 
jury with their improper standard only stands to emphasize and 
enlarge their import to a jury thereby aggravating their 
prejudicial effect. See Devine v. Cook, 279 P.2d 1073 (Utahli 
D. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
NOT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND IN 
NOT GRANTING HIS MOTION FOR NEli' TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF THE STAIC 
OF LIMITATIONS. 
It is now appropriate to put the legal standards in 
the context of the facts at issue before the court. At the 
conclusion of the evidence, plaintiff made a Motion for a 
Directed Verdict on the issue of the statute of limitations. 
That issue was renewed with the plaintiff's Motion for New Tri; 
Both motions were denied by the trial court. It is plaintiff': 
position that the evidence taken in its entirety does not 
support submission of this issue to the jury either under 
the erroneous instructions given to the jury or the correct 
standard discussed earlier. 
This cause of action was filed on July 29, 1976. (R. 
Mr. Conk first consulted with the defendant doctor on March 
28, 1973 (R. 790). The ileal bypass surgery was performed at 
the Valley West Hospital on April 23, 1973. (R. 800) Therefo~ 
purposes of the tolling the statute of limitations we are 
primarily concerned about Mr. Conk's discovering his "injury" 
(as that term has been defined herein) prior to July 29, 1974· 
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To begin with, there is absolutely no evidence 
that: 
1. Prior to July 29, 1974, Mr. Conk became aware 
of any preexisting kidney problems that would have contraindicated 
surgery; 
2. Mr. Conk was aware of any kidney problems 
possibly associated with his bypass surgery at any time 
prior to the difficulties that demonstrated themselves 
beginning in January, 1975; 
3. Mr. Conk was ever aware of the experimental 
nature of the operation prior to his last treatment by the 
defendant in 1975; 
4. Dr. Chambers ever informed the patient that 
any of the conditions he was experiencing were in any way 
out of the ordinary for a postoperative bypass patient prior to 
the kidney problems that were diagnosed in the early months 
of 1975; 
5. Mr. Conk should not have relied on the assurances 
given to him by the defendant that his condition would stabilize, 
nor that he didn't rely on those assurances. 
During the entire period of time prior to the first 
of 1975, Mr. conk testified that Dr. Chambers told him that 
his condition would stablize, that his condition would smooth 
out, that it would improve, that what he was experienceing was 
to be expected in the type of surgery he had and that he would 
be alright (R. 997, 1000, 1004, 1006, 1064, 1068). 
Mr. conk further testified that he had confidence in 
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-the doctor, that he was the professional, that he was of the 
opinion that the doctor knew what he was talking about, th~~ 
had no complaints about the doctor's care, and that the 
doctor was doing his best (R. 999, 1004, 1007). 
It is of more than passing interest to note again 
that Dr. Chambers did not refute giving Mr. Conk the assurance: 
noted. 
A study of Dr. Chambers direct testimony demonstrate: 
clearly what was being told his patient on various postoperati': 
examinations: 
September 28, 1973--
Q Will you tell us what was written by you and what 
was written by the nurse, please? 
A "Post-operative check five months." My note says, 
"No complaints, some malaise. Happy about operation. (R. 
December 24, 1973--
Q Tell us what is noted, please?. 
A 79 pound weight loss, blood pressure 150 over 
110. My entry, "no symptoms, doing very well on blood 
pressure medicine." (R. 1151) 
May 10, 1974--
lli 
Q Give us the notes and what you found and what you wrot: 
A "post-operative check 13 months. Blood pressure 
160 over 110. Weight loss 92 pounds. Plateau of weight. 
Has been eating heavily and working hard. Color good. 
Patient looks almost good enough, but could lose some more wei~ 
(R. 1153) 
Laboratory test June 14, 1974--
Q All right. Now, can you look in your laboratory 
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reports and tell us the results of the chemistry survey? 
I can call your attention to the date of about June 14th, 
12th to 14th would be the last sheet that you would be looking for. 
A The laboratory test is dated June 14, 1974. 
* * * * * 
Q Did you find any abnormal reading in any of those 
chemistries of the blood? 
A No, sir. 
Q Any of the electrolytes that were abnormal or lower than 
normal? 
A No, sir, they are all normal. 
August 1, 1974--
Q What does that say? 
(R. 1154-1155) 
A That says "15 months post-operative, 99 pounds weight 
loss, blood pressure 150 over 100. Charleyhorse in both legs." 
Q This is what the nurse wrote about the patient? 
A Yes, this is the nurse's note of his complaint, 
charleyhorse in both legs. My note says, "Post-operative 
shunt very good. Vitamin B12 given." 
Q Now, at that point when you say very good, that's 
compared to what? What you would expect or what the normal 
is, or what? 
A I would say very good for the course of the post-
operative intestinal shunt patient. (R. 1155) 
December 30, 1974--
Q All right. Now, we go into December 30th of '74, or 
31st, whichever it is. Tell us what she wrote and what the 
readings were and what you found and what you noted? 
-33-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the fiduciary and confidential patient-doctor relationship. 
As the Supreme Court of California (which has a statute si~~ 
to that of Utah) has put it: 
the patient is fully entitled to rely upon 
the physician's professional skill and judgment 
while under his care, and has little choice but~ 
do so. It follows, accordingly, that during the 
continuance of his professional relationship, whi~ 
is fiduciary in nature, the degree of diligence requt 
of a patient in ferreting out and learning the 
negligent causes of his condition is diminished . 
Sanchez v. South Hoover, supra~ 553 P.2d at 1135. 
Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative 
defense, defendant has the burden to show by a preponderance oi 
the evidence that Mr. Conk discovered or should have discov~~ 
his "injury" on or before July 29, 1974. There being no evide:. 
of actual discovery of the injury by the plaintiff, defenda~ 
must affirmatively show that through the use of reasonable 
diligence Mr. Conk should have discovered the injury prior 
to that date. That reasonable dilignce would, arguendo, 
require Mr. Conk to inquire of Dr. Chambers into what the 
status of his condition was; was it caused by the operation; 
and was his condition any different than would have been 
normal given the nature of the procedure. 
In order for the defendant to prevail on that iss~, 
he must present subs tan ti ve evidence that Mr. Conk' s inquiries 
would reasonably have led him to discover that the effects of 
the operation were adverse to his heal th and contrary to what 
was normal for a postoperative ileal bypass patient. Such an 
inquiry to Dr. Chambers would have revealed the facts previ~~ 
stated to the effect that all was well. The doctor himself 
had no idea by his own testimony of any untoward, unanticipateL 
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negative turn to the physical condition of his patient 
postoperatively. 
The defendant simply failed to produce any evidence 
support that affirmative burden. It is patently ridiculous to place 
the burden on Ralph Conk to diagnose kidney problems when his 
own doctor could not do so himself. 
The above argument is based solely on discovery of 
physical harm. It becomes more persuasive if the correct 
definition of "injury" as being physical harm plus invasion of legally 
protected right is added to the equation. No evidence was 
presented by defendant to demonstrate that such inquiry would have 
been fruitful at any relevent time. Mr. Conk's reliance on his 
fiduciary is by substantive evidence unassailed and uncontroverted. 
As to its reasonableness, no triggering event took place to shake 
that relationship until the first evidence of kidney damage 
occurred in the first part of 1975. 
The statute of limitations should not have been submitted 
to the jury as an issue for its consideration. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT FOR NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO OBTAIN 
INFORMED CONSENT PRIOR TO SURGERY, AND IN IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY ON THAT ISSUE. 
It has become universally recognized that prior to 
performing a surgical procedure a physician owes his patient 
a duty to inform him of the treatment options available and the 
risks attendant with each to allow the patient a meaningful 
opportunity to grant or withold his knowing and informed 
consent to the treatment contemplated by the physician. See, e.g., 
Dunham v. wright, 423 F.2d 920, 943-46 (3rd Cir. 1970) (applying 
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Pennsylvania law); Campbell v. Oliva, 424 F.2d 1244, 1250-51 
(6th Cir. 1970) (applying Tennesse law); Woods v. Brumlop, 7! 
N.M. 221, 337 P.2d 520, 524-25 (1962); Mason v. Ellsworth, 
Wash. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909, 918-19 (1970). 
In the instant case, the appellant alleged, among 
others, that Dr. Chambers failed to advise him of two material 
facts pertaining to the intestinal bypass operation: 1) that t 
operation was still experimental in nature and without sufficiE· 
history to have all of its side effects known; and 2) that 
it would result in increased stress being placed upon the 
patient's kidneys, making any kidney disease a contraindicatior 
to the performance of the operation. 
The respondent testified unequivocally at trial that 
the intestinal bypass he performed on Mr. Conk was an experi-
mental operation and that it was important that the patient ~ 
advised of this fact: 
Q (By Mr. Black) Now, Doctor, during the time that you 
proceeded through these 25 operations, this particular intestir: 
bypass operation was experimental, was it not? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And it was important, and is important in the 
medical profession, that in the event a doctor undertakes to 
perform an experimental operation with the results of such 
operation being unknown to the profession and the consequent 
risks that are involved in unknown results, to tell the 
patient forthright that the operation was, in fact, an 
experimental kind of operation? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And as a matter of fact, in the other hearing in t~c 
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matter, your other patient in 1972, you advised that patient 
that the operation was experimental, and you stated in a 
deposition in that case that you advised the patient that it 
was experimental because you thought the patient ought to 
know that fact; isn't that true? 
A Yes, sir. 
(R. 787-88). 
Mr. Conk testified that he was never informed that 
the operation was experimental. (R. 435-36). Dr. Chambers 
indicated at his deposition that he did not think he advised 
Mr. Conk of the experimental nature of the operation, but at 
trial he gave a different version: 
Q And as a matter of fact, when we come down to April 
of 1973 when you first saw Mr. Conk, when you talked to him 
about this particular operation, you did not advise Mr. 
Conk that the operation was experimental, did you? 
A I don't believe that's correct, sir. 
Q You don't believe that you didn't advise him? 
A I believe I did. 
Q Well now, Doctor, you will recall that I took your 
deposition in this case on the 1st day of June, 1977, at 
my office? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And Mr. Snow was present, who is your counsel? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q You were again placed under oath? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And I will ask you to state--
-39-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THE COURT: lvha t page? 
MR. BLACK: Again at page 17, line 19. 
Q And I will ask you to read along with me. Did you or 
did you not make the following answers to the following questic 
"Question: Did you tell him that this was an experi-
mental operation? 
"Answer: No, I don't think so." 
Did you or did you not make that answer to that quest;: 
on that occasion? 
A I did. 
Q But you will concede before this Court and jury at 
this time that if an operation which is proposed is, in fact, 
experimental, the patient ought to know; is that not true? 
A Yes ,sir. 
Q But this patient wasn't told that, was he? 
A I said "I think" in that one; I say "I think" now. 
I believe I did. 
Q Well, if you did, then you testified falsely on this 
occasion, is that right? 
A I said "I think" in there, and I say it again today. 
(R. 788-89). 
Appellant submits that on the basis of this testimon: 
it would be error to make any finding that Dr. Chambers inforik 
Mr. Conk of the experimental nature of the operation. Pitt~ 
against the patient's unambiguous denial that he ever receiv~ 
any warning that the operation was an experiment, the physiciai 
inconsistent responses that at one time he felt he didn't 
inform and later felt he did inform Mr. Conk of the nature of 
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the procedure are insufficient to present a jury question on -the 
issue. Where a witness' testimony is as internally inconsistent 
as to refute itself, it is insufficient to support a finding on 
an ultimate issue. See, e.g., State v. Pratt, 25 Utah 2d 76, 
475 P.2d 1013 (1970); Alvardo v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 
P.2d 986 (1954). 
Moreover, on the issue of the hazzard presented by the 
increased stress placed on the patient's kidneys due to the 
operation, there is no dispute that the appellant was not 
informed of such increased stress or of the fact that he, in 
the opinion of Dr. Chambers, had damaged kidneys before the 
operation was performed. Dr. Chambers testified that he never 
informed Mr. Conk that an added burden would be placed on 
his kidneys after the operation (R. 793), and responded as 
follows to further questions on the subject: 
Q Now, it would be very important for you as a treating 
physician to know, if it be a fact, that a patient had a kidney 
problem prior to such an operation; isn't that true? 
A I don't know what "kidney problem" means. 
Q Well, I think the word "problem" is a word that we 
all understand. If a person had a problem with his kidneys, 
it would be important that you know that before you perform this 
operation, wouldn't it? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And why would it be important? 
A Well, the obviously continuing the function of the 
kidneys through the operative period and the post-operative 
period. 
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Q And that would be a matter you would take under advis,. 
and into consideration in determing whether a patient was a 
proper candidate for a bypass operation? 
A Yes, sir. (R. 793-94) 
* * * * * 
Q And if he had a significant problem you would abort th; 
operation, wouldn't you? 
A That is correct, sir. 
Q And if he had a significant problem, you would at leas; 
tell him so and tell him how that was involved in the decisior.-
making with regard to the performance of this operation? 
A That is correct, sir. 
Q And as a matter of fact, Dr. Chambers, the Granger 
Medical Clinic records reveal that Mr. Conk, in fact, had a 
kidney problem at the time that you made the determination to 
perform this operation? 
Well, I'm waiting for your answer. 
A I wasn't asked for an answer, sir. 
MR. BLACK: Would you read the question? 
(The question was read by the reporter.) 
A I don't agree with that statement. You didn't ask 
me a question, but I don't agree with it. 
Q You don't think he had any kidney problem at all? 
A Yes, I think he had a problem related to his hypertens: 
the kidney problem that goes with hypertension. 
Q r toe That isn't the way you answered the question when 
your deposition, is it, Dr. Chambers? 
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s: 
oc 
And I will ask you to read with me the following question 
and the following answer. 
THE COURT: What page? 
Q And this in on line 8, page 19: 
"Question: And in this connection, did you become 
aware of the fact, if it be a fact, that he'd had some kidney 
problems before this time? 
"Answer: No." 
Did you answer that question in that manner? 
A Yes, sir. (R. 794-96) 
* * * * * 
Q Although you never told Mr. Conk anything about his 
kidneys in discussing this operation with him, at the time 
you discussed it with him you knew that he was suffering from 
kidney damage; isn't that true? 
A Not necessarily kidney damage at the time I operated, sir. 
Q Well, Dr. Chambers, down the road a ways on November 18, 
1975, you wrote a letter "To Whom It May Concern" regarding 
Mr. Ralph Conk, and signed your name to it. It's marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 13-P, and I will ask you to examine that 
letter and state to this Court and jury whether you, in fact, 
wrote the letter and affixed your signature to it? 
A I did write this letter as of November 18th, 1975, 
and this is my signature. 
Q And the subject matter of that letter is Mr. Conk's 
kidneys, is it not? 
A Yes, sir. 
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Q And that letter, or a copy of it, is located in the 
Granger Medical Clinic records, is it not? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And it' s a part of Mr. Conk' s records that you brought 
court here with you today? 
A Yes, sir. 
MR. BLACK: We offer the exhibit, your Honor. 
MR. SNOW: No objection. 
THE COU IT: Exhibit 13-P is received. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 13 was received 
into evidence.) 
MR. BLACK: We ask permission to read the exhiL 
to the jury, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. SNOW: No. 
THE COURT: You may 
MR. BLACK: On Granger Medical Clinic stationer. 
dated November 18, 1975. 
"To Whom It May Concern: 
"Re: Mr. Ralph Conk 
"Mr. Ralph Conk was referred to me by ~. 
Lavere Poulsen on March 28, 1973. At that time he had seven 
obesity that had not responded to the usual measures of treatr 
He also had severe hypertension. 
"On April 23, 1975, I performed an intestinal 
shunt procedure because of the obesity and the hypertensiOO· 
His immediate post-operative course went very well. 
"At the time I first saw Mr. Conk prior to hi 5 
-44-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
intestinal shunt procedure, he had severe hypertension which, 
of course, meant that he had kidney damage which occurred with 
it. Kidney function tests as early as March, 1972, showed some 
elevation of urea nitrogen. 
"It is my impression that there was kidney damage 
related to the hypertension prior to his intestinal shunt 
procedure. 
"Signed Wallace L. Chambers, M.D." 
Q Is that a correct recitation of that letter? 
A One mistake there, and it's in there, too. 
Q Did I correctly read the letter, Doctor? 
A You correctly read the letter, and there is a mistake. 
The operation was April 23, 1973. It does say "75 there. 
Q Thank you. And that is an incorrect recitation of 
the date. 
And at the time that you decided on this operation, number 
one, you didn't tell him about the information contained in 
this letter, did you? 
A I told him about his hypertension, and this letter states 
that the kidney damage is related to his hypertension. And I 
talked about his hypertension. I did not talk about 
kidney damage. (R. 798-800) 
Mr. Conk also confirmed the fact that he wasn't 
informed about the possible alteration of the function of the 
kidneys or the fact of his already existing kidney damage. 
Q Mr. conk, what, if anything, did Dr. Chambers tell you 
roncerning what the Granger Medical Clinic records showed as 
of April 1973 concerning kidney damage as a result of a long-
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standing high blood pressure condition? 
A He told me nothing. 
Q What, if anything, did Dr. Chambers tell you concernk 
what the effects of this operation ~ight have on your kidney~ 
A He didn't tell me anything about my kidneys. 
Q What change in the course of your conduct would you ha 
done had you been told that this bypass procedure was, because 
of its very nature, a dehydrating procedure and could cause 
further damage to your kidneys? 
A I would never have had it. 
Q What, if anything, did the doctor tell you about the 
possibility of kidney stones occurring as a result of this 
surgery? 
A He didn't tell me anything about the kidneys. 
The kidneys were never mentioned. 
Q What, if anything, did he tell you concerning whethH 
or not, in order to be a candidate for this procedure, an 
individual should have either--well, strike that. Let me 
restate the question, Mr. Conk. 
What, if anything, did Dr. Chambers tell you concernin: 
the advisability of having this operation should an indivi~~ 
have a pre-existing renal or kidney disease? 
A He didn't tell me anything about the kidney disease. 
he had told me any ting about the kidney disease, I would never 
have the operation. Kidney disease, I was very, very frighten' 
of. I watched my favorite uncle pass away with kidney disease 
and if anything at any time would have showed me that it wouli 
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have affected my kidneys, I would have stayed within miles of· 
it. There would be no way I would have had the operation. 
(R. 1038-39) 
The significance of a physician's failure to inform 
his patient of the risks inherent in a particular surgical 
procedure is that it deprives an individual of the right to 
make his own determination, on the basis of adequate facts, 
of what is to be done with his own body. 
When initially confronted with the problem of 
determining the scope of a physician's duty of disclosure, 
courts tended to view the disclosure requirement as an aspect 
of medical practice which should be judged by the same rules 
applicable to performance of surgery, forming a diagnosis, or 
prescribing medication: did the physician's practice meet the 
standard of care of a reasonably competent medical practitioner 
performing in the same or similar circumstances? The duty of 
disclosure was viewed in reference to a medical standard, and 
the standard was set by physicians practicing under like cir-
cumstances. As a result, expert testimony was required to 
establish the appropriate standard before any breach of that 
standard could be found. 
More recently, however, the law has come to recognize 
that in disclosure cases the proper focus should be upon the 
needs of the patient and not the practice of the profession. 
The patient's right of self-determination is the overriding 
concern and medical considerations only become relevant when 
disclosure itself would have a dramatically adverse effect on 
the patient's health. Under this formulation of the standard, a 
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physician is negligent if he fails to inform his patient of ar. 
material risks involved in the proposed procedure, and he is 
liable in damages if the patient suffered harm as a result of 
such procedures being performed without his informed conseAf, 
In Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. ir 
the court called into question the practice of judging of a 
physician's duty of disclosure in terms of its compliance wiE 
the practice prevailing in the medical community. The court 
noted that, in reality, there is serious doubt as to whether 
any discernible custom exists among doctors evidencing a 
professional concensus on what is proper communciation of ris: 
information to patients. As the court noted, there is a 
. . danger that what in fact is no custom 
at all may be taken as an affirmative custom 
to maintain silence, and that physician- wit-
nesses to the so-called custom may state merely 
their personal opinions as to what they 
or others would do under given conditions. 
we cannot gloss over the inconsistency between 
reliance on a general practice respecting 
divulgence and, on the other hand, realization 
that the myriad of variables among patients 
makes each case so different that its omission 
can rationally be justified only by the effect 
of its individual circumstances. Nor can we 
ignore the fact that to bind the disclosure 
obligation to medical usage is to abrogate the 
decision on revelation to the physician alone. 
Respect for the patient's right of self-
determination on particular therapy demands a 
standard set by law for physicians rather than 
one which physicians may or may not impose 
upon themselves. 464 F.2d at 783-84 (footnotes 
omitted). 
The court held that expert testimony is not ess~~ 
to establish a doctor's duty to disclose risks of a propso~ 
treatment. The court stated that lay witness testimony can 
competently establish a physician's failure to disclose 
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particular risk information, the materiality of a risk to the 
patient's decision on whether to undergo the proposed treatment, 
or to the effect reasonably expectable if the disclosure had 
been made. While the court noted that expert testimony would 
be needed to identify and elucidate for the factfinder the risks 
of the proposed treatment, the standard of care required of 
the physician in making disclosure about such risks was expressly 
held not to be dependent upon the practice of physicians in the 
community. 
Similarly, in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 
1 (1972), the court held that expert testimony is not required 
to establish a doctor's duty to disclose risks of a proposed 
treatment. Stressing that the rule of many courts, relating the 
reasonablness of a physician's disclosure to the custom of 
physicians in the community, was needlessly overbroad, the court 
reasoned that even if there can be said to be a medical community 
standard as to the disclosure requirement for any prescribed 
treatment, it appears so nebulous that doctors become, in effect, 
vested with virtual absolute discretion. To bind the disclosure 
obligation to medical usage, the court declared, is to leave 
the decision on disclosure to the physician alone. It was pointed 
out that unlimited discretion in the physician is irreconcilable 
with the basic right of the patient to make the ultimate informed 
decision regarding the course of treatment to which he knowl-
edgeably consents. The court stated that a medical doctor, 
being the expert, appreciates the risks inherent in the procedure 
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he is prescribing, the risks of a decision not to undergo t~ 
treatment, and the probabliity of a successful outcome of t~ 
treatment. However, the court explained that once this 
information has been disclosed, the doctor's expert functioo 
has been performed, the weighing of these risks against t~ 
subjective fears and hopes of the patient not being an 
expert skill. It was emphasized that such an evaluation a~ 
decision is a nonmedical judgment reserved to the patient 
alone. Stressing that the scope of the disclosure required 
of physicians defies simple definition, the court stated 
that the scope of the required disclosure must be measured 
by the patient's need, and that this need is for whatever 
information is material to the decision whether to undergo 
the proposed treatment. 
In Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.~ 
647 (1971), where the plaintiff patient alleged tht she shooli 
been warned of the risk of perforation of her stomach from a 
gastroscopic examination, the court, reversing a judgment for 
the two defendant doctors, rejected a requirement of expert 
testimony to establish a doctor's duty to disclose a given~ 
of a proposed teatment as unacceptable since such a require-
ment failed to produce equitable results and demeaned the 
concept of physical integrity of the individual. While statin 
that it had high regard for the professionalism of the medicai 
community, the court noted that the standard of disclosure 
within the medical community bears no inherent relationship tc 
the amount of knowledge that any particualr patient might 
require in order to make an informed choice. Further justifl'l 
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.S' 
tc 
its conclusion that expert testimony was not necessary in a 
disclosure of risk case, the court stated that any physician 
testifying on the issue of the duty of disclosure would be 
testifying as to either what he would have done under similar 
circumstances, or as to what he thinks another practitioner 
should have done under such circumstances, neither of which 
supplies an adequate definition of the "community standard." 
It was also noted that the plaintiff's difficulty in finding 
a physician to testify against another physician had to be 
considered. The court stated that an equitable test in 
disclosure of risk cases would be whether the physician dis-
closed all those facts, risks, and alternatives that a reason-
able man, in the situation which the physician knew or should 
have known to be the plaintiff's, would deem significant in 
making a decision to under go the recommended treatment. In 
addition, calling attention to the rule that generally in 
medical malpractice suits expert testimony is required, the 
court stated that there is a basic distinction between the 
normal malpractice suit, where the issue is whether the 
physician failed to conform to accepted medical practice, 
and informed consent cases, where the salient question is 
whether the patient made an effective assent to treatment and 
where the determination of whether there was any dereliction 
of professional duty on the part of thephysician is only one 
factor in the resolution of the ultimate issue. 
This view of the applicable standard in disclosure 
cases is clearly the modern trend among courts which have 
considered the question in recent years. See, e.g., Hamilton v. 
Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099 (Colo. App. 1976); Zeleznik v. Jewish 
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Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 App. Div. 2d 199, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163 
(1973); Congrove v. Holmes, 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 308 N.E. 2d 
765 (1975); Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp, 349 A.2d 703 
(Vt. 1974); Holt v. Nelson, 523 P.2d 211 (Wash. App. 1974); 
Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852 (Wash. App. 1974), aff'd as 
Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975); Getchell v. Mansfield, 
260 Or. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971). 
The fundamental principles set forth in these cases 
are that a patient has the right to be informed about: 1) Ak 
native treatments to that proposed by the physician; 2) all 
reasonably forseeable material risks involved in each altem~ 
including that proposed by the physician; and 3) the risks inL 
in no treatment at all. The courts have frequently emphasizec 
that "materiality" is not a clear cut, self-defining term, bu'. 
[t)he factors contributing significance to 
the dangerousness of a medical technique are, 
of course, the incidence of injury and the 
degree of the harm threatened. A very small 
chance of death may well be significant; a 
potential disability which dramatically out-
weighs the potential benefit of the therapy 
or the detriments of the existing malady 
may summon discussion with the patient. 
Canterbury v. Spence, supra, 464 F.2d at 788. 
If the evidence shows that a physician failed to di: 
material risks, then expert testimony can be offered to ~~ 
that such a failure was justified as proper medical practi~ 
to protect the patient. However, as the court noted in 
Canterbury v. Spence, supra: 
[t)he physician's privilege to withold infor-
mation for therapeutic reasons must be care-
fully circumscribed, ... for otherwise it 
might devour the disclosure rule itsel~ .. The 
privilege does not accept the pate7nal7stic 
notion that the physician may remain silent 
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sim~ly because divulgence might prompt the 
patient to forego therapy the physician 
feels the patient really needs. That 
attitude presumes instablility or perversity 
for even the normal patient, and runs 
counter to the foundation principle that 
the patient should and ordinarily can make 
the choice for himself. 464 F.2d 789. 
The sole purpose for the expert testimony on the 
standard of disclosure in the medical profession would be to 
show a specific justification that could be considered by the trier 
of fact, but only as it effects the legal duty imposed upon 
physicians to reveal all material risks. It is in the nature 
of a defense to the prima facie breach of the duty imposed 
by law, not a yardstick of the duty itself, and even as a 
defense it would only justify non-disclosure when such dis-
closure would have demonstrably adverse effect on the patient. 
See Hamilton v. Hardy, supra. 
In summary, courts are now recognizing that a physician's 
duty of disclosure to his patient is not defined in terms of 
medical practice, but rather by the needs of the patient and 
his right of self-determination. 
In the instant case, Dr. Chambers admittedly did not 
inform the appellant of the risks posed to the continued function 
of his kidneys and wasn't certain whether or not he even advised 
Mr. Conk of many other ill effects which might be seen to flow 
from the operation which, due to its experimental nature, were 
as yet unknown. 
This type of information is precisely what a patient 
deserves to know prior to consenting to an operation, and particularly 
an elective surgery such as that presented in this matter. 
The normal test, whether a physician informed his 
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patient of all forseeable material risks inherent in the 0~~ 
cannot be used to determine the duty to disclose the experi~~ 
nature of an operation because, by definition, many of what wi: 
later be found to be material risks are totally unknown bee~~ 
the procedure is new. It would be absurd to allow a physician 
to have no dialogue at all about the risk factor of a surgery 
simply because it is so novel that the risks are unknown. 
When such is the case, the doctor should, as a mater of law, 
inform the patient that many of the potential dangers of the 
surgery are as yet unknown and allow the patient to weigh 
for himself his desire for treatment against the fear of 
the unknown. This subjective decision of whether to proceed 
when much is not known is one for the patient, not the physi~ 
While this issue appears to be novel, appellant s~r 
that it is also irrefutable that a doctor owes as great a duty 
to disclose what he admittedly does not and cannot be expectec 
to know as that which he does know. Appellant respectfully 
requests this Court to hold that as a matter of law a physici« 
breaches his duty to obtain a patient's informed consent wh~ 
he does not disclose that a surgical procedure is experime~~ 
and that this duty was breached in the instant action. 
Alternatively, appellant submits that Dr. Chambers' 
failure to disclose to Mr. Conk the condition of his kidne~ 
prior to the surgery and the adverse effect the surgery c~N 
have on damaged kidneys constituted a breach of the duty owed 
by all physicians to inform their patients of all material 
risks involved in their treatment. Clearly, Dr. Chambers ~U 
the condition of Mr. Conk' s kidneys prior to surgery was sigP 
cant or he would not have noted it for the record after t~~ 
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and the onset of Mr. Conk's more pronounced kidney disease. As it 
was significant, Mr. Conk should have been so advised prior 
to surgery. 
The court below erred by failing to direct the jury 
that Dr. Chambers had breached his duty of disclosure to Mr. 
Conk and focusing their inquiry on whether such breach caused 
the appellant any damage. This error demands that the matter 
be reversed and remanded for consideration of the question of 
damage. 
Even assuming the court was correct in allowing the 
issue of informed consent to go to the jury, the instructions 
given by the court, and excepted to by appellant, improperly 
stated the law and were internally inconsistent, thereby 
requiring reversal of the judgment entered below. 
In instruction number 15 the court charged the jury 
that Dr. Chambers owed Mr. Conk the duty to advise him of "any 
risks or uncertainties involved in the operation" of which he 
was aware or should have been aware, including the fact that the 
operation was experimental. (R. 154) In the next instruction, 
number 16, the court informed the jury that the physician's duty 
was to inform Mr. Conk of those "reasonably anticipated risks 
and complications as would have been disclosed as part of the 
accepted practice" of doctors practicing in accord with the 
professional standard of care. The court further indicated that 
To prevail on this issue, plaintiff must prove 
each of the following propositions: 
1. That in discussing the operation with him 
Dr. chambers failed to conform to the standard 
of disclosure which was required by accepted 
medical practice among surgeons practicing at 
that time, and 
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.. 
2. That a reasonably prudent person who had been 
considering an intestinal by-pass operation for 
weight reduction would have refused the operation , 
such disclosure had been made by the defendant. 1· 
In determining what a reasonably prudent person 
in the patient's position would do under the ciu~ 
stances, you must use the viewpoint of the patient 
before the surgery was performed and before the 
occurrence of any complications or harmful results 
alleged to have resulted from the surgery. 
These two instructions are inconsistent with each 
other, as the first imposes a duty to inform concerning subjec: 
which the physician knows or has reason to know present risks 
or uncertainties, while the latter instruction limits this 
duty by excusing failure to inform of known risks or uncertair 
if the "accepted medical practice" would have been to withoW 
such information. As demonstrated in the above, defining 
the disclosure duty in terms of medical practice is error 
because it is inconsistent with the overridding interest of 
the patient in having as complete knowledge as possible when 
choosing what course to follow. The medical standard of 
care defines what the physician should know, but the legal 
duty to reveal that information should not be restricted or 
modified by any prevailing practice among physicians of not 
disclosing risks, or uncertainties, of which they are requ~s 
to be aware. 
Had the court not modified instruction 15 with the 
improper standard set forth in the next instruction, the jury 
would have been free to determine that Dr. Chambers breached 
his duty to the appellant by failing to inform him of the 
experimental nature of the operation or the hazards posed to'. 
kidneys. However, instruction 16 adds an additional element 
necessary to establish a breach of duty, namely that such fa: 
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to disclose was inconsistent with established medical practice. 
Appellant submits that this is an improper standard under the cases 
set forth above and one which imposes upon a plaintiff the 
untenable burden of showing that not only did the physician 
fail to disclose facts he knew or should have known which were 
material to the operation, but that other physicians would 
have affirmatively disclosed such facts. This elevates the 
importance attached to a fact by the doctor over that which 
would be attached to the same information by the patient,and 
it is the patient's right of self-determination which courts 
now recognize as the predicate giving rise to the duty to disclose. 
Such duty is rendered hollow if physicians retain the ultimate 
right to limit that duty by community practice; that is, 
by setting a medical standard governing what facts patients 
are entitled to know and what facts they are not prior to giving 
their consent. 
It is axiomatic that it is reversable error for the 
court to give inconsistent or contradictory insturctions on a 
material issue of a case. As early as 1900 the Utah Supreme Court 
acknowledged that 
[i]instructions on a material point in a 
case which are inconsistent or contradictory, 
should not be given. The giving of such instructions 
is error and a sufficient ground of reversal be-
cause it' is impossible after verdict to ascertain 
which instruction the jury followed, or what 
influence the erroneous instruction had in their 
deliberation. 
Konold v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 21 Utah 379, 399 (1900). 
Appellant submits that the court's instruction number 
16 is an inaccurate statement of the duty owed by a physician to 
his patient and is inconsistent with the duty defined in instruc-
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tion 15. As such, the giving of the challenged instruction 
is reversible error which requires that the case be reman~a 
for submission to the jury on the basis of a proper statement 
of the law. 
POINT III 
IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIO:; 
9, 10, and 13 DEFINING "SAME OR SIMILAR COMMUNITIES" THE 
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR, PARTICULARLY IN 
ALL OF THE INSTRUCTIONS WHEREIN "SAME OR SIMILAR COMMUNITIES" 
IS USED DESCRIBING THE STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF NATIONALLY 
BOARD CERTIFIED SURGEONS PERFORMING INTESTINAL SHUNTING 
PROCEDURES FOR THE PURPOSE OF WEIGHT REDUCTION. 
For the convenience of the court we cite herein 
Plaintiff's Requested Instructions 9, 10 and 13: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
On the subject of standard of care of physicians 
and/or board certified surgeons in discharging the 
duties of their respective profess ions, this Court 
has from time to time made reference to the terms 
"community" and "similar Communities" and to 
physicians and/or board certified surgeons practic· 
ing within a "community" or "similar communcities". 
You are instructed that the term "similar comrnunitit 
for the purpose of this case, means any area of 
the United States where physicians and/or board 
certified surgeons practice and where operative 
procedures are performed, which are similar in 
nature to the operative procedure here involved. 
(R. 101) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
You are further instructed that where the evidence 
shows a national standard of care to exist with 
respect to a particular surgical procedure then 
board certified surgeons throughout the nation an 
required to perform said procedure in accordance 
with said national standard. (R. 102) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
Plaintiff suf~icient~y ~eets the burden of proof ~ 
required of him by snowing by a preponderan~e of . 
· · · his treat evidence that the defendant physicain, in 
ment of the plaintiff, either did something thata 
board certified surgeon of ordinary skill, care.al~ 
. · l ar diligence would not have done under like or Slffi f 
· · ali 
circumstances, or that said defendant physician 
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or omi~ted to ~o something that a board certified surgeon 
of ordinary skill, care and diligence would have done 
under like or similar circumstances or conditions in 
the same or similar communities. The expression 
"board certified surgeons of ordinary skill, care 
and diligence" as used in this instruction, neans 
board certified surgeons possessing that reasonable 
degree of professional learning and skill generally 
possessed by board certified surgeons of good standing 
in the same or in similar communities nationwide. 
(R. 107) 
The trial court refused to give the above instructions, 
leaving to the jury the determination not only of what the 
standard was and whether the defendant breached that standard 
of care required, but also whether that standard was a national 
standard or merely a local standard. Plaintiff asserts that 
that is error of a very grave nature. If the jury was to 
determine that the standard was merely a local standard, or 
that plaintiff's experts did not practice in communities similar 
to Salt Lake City, then no evidence presented by plaintiff's 
experts as to the neglectful performance of the operation and 
the negligence in follbw-up care would be considered. The 
two primary experts for the plaintiff were from San Diego 
and New York City. 
There can be little doubt of the prejudicial and 
improper nature of the refusal to give the above instructions 
to the jury in light of the recent case of Swan v. Lamb, et al., 
584 P. 2d 814 (Utah 1978). 
Justice Ellett succinctly stated for the majority of 
the court what law should apply to this type of case concerning 
what the appropriate standard of care should be in our modern 
and advanced technical age: 
It thus appears that in the past, this court 
has stated that the doctor in treating a patient 
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cannot be held to be negligent unless it is 
shown that he did not comply with the standards 
used and approved by other doctors in the same 
vicinity. Those holdings were proper at the times 
when they were made; however, there is no reason 
to hold that doctors in Salt Lake City who profess 
to be experts in a field of surgery or medicine 
should not be held to the standard of care 
exercised by.experts in the same field in cities 0; 
comparable size and throughout the medical professi! 
Our quality of medical care in Utah rates with t~ 
best in the nation. Our hospitals are among the 
finest with the most recent technology, and the med• 
college at the University of Utah enjoys an outstu~ 
reputation. In addition, doctors practicing their 
profession here come from various medical colleges 
throughout the nation. Medical journals are availar, 
nationally as are seminars and workshops. There is: 
need for doctors here to have a lower standard of~ 
than that of other doctors who are practicing in 
similar localities. Indeed, it is doubtful that~ 
physician in the State of Utah would be willing~~ 
that his skill and knowledge is not equal to any ~~ 
physician trained in his field, or that his ability 
is less than that of doctors trained and practicing 
in other cities. 
True it may be that doctors practicing in small rura 
communities cannot be expected to have the facilitit 
or the equipment to perform equally as well as can 
physicians in Salt Lake City; however, they have 
the same quality of training and should know enough 
to refuse to undertake operations or to treat patier.: 
if they are not in a position to successfully admini: 
the needed treatment--save perhaps in emergency case• 
If surgeons throughout the nation consider it 
improper to allow foreign substances that have ~~ 
injected into the spinal canal to remain there ~fter 
completing a myelogram, it beggars the imagination 
to think a doctor in Salt Lake City could escape 
responsibility for harm done to his patient by fail; 
to remove the substance in the canal so that it m~ 
be absorbed by the body. If this procedure is gene'.: 
regarded to be unsatisfactory or dangerous, nod~ 
should escape responsibility merely because the . 
local practice has not yet adopted it." (Emphasis 
added) 
Without the proffered instruction, there is a 
serious likelihood that the jury misunderstood the "similU 
locality rule" as it is applied in Utah. As Justice Wilki~ 
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noted in his concurring opinion in Swan, 
"in determining similarity the courts will not 
now look to such socio-economic facts as population, 
type of economy, and income level, but to factors 
more directly relating to the practice of medicine." 
And, Justice Crockett noted that for purposes of this rule, 
Los Angeles and Salt Lake City are similar communities, a conclusion 
no jury would reach without an adequate definition of the 
standard such as the plaintiff offered in this case. 
Without the excluded instructions, the jury was left 
without proper guidelines as to the standard of care, making 
the trial court's Instructions, 12, 14, 15 and 18 and any 
other instructions wherein the same or similar community 
standard is set forth misleading, improper and prejudicial. 
(R. 145, 150, 153, 154, 157.) 
It is recognized that certain of the above instructions 
are those submitted to the court by plaintiff, however, they 
were submitted with Instructions 9, 10, and 13, defining their 
meaning. Absent 9, 10, and 13, the other instructions 
erroneously and prejudicially set forth the law. 
CONCLUSION 
It is claimed by plaintiff herein that the trial 
court prejudicially erred in several particulars. The first 
two errors concern the trial Court's Instruction Numbers 24 and 
25 that in essence state that the statute of limitations 
begins to run before the plaintiff has a reasonable oppor-
tunity to know that whatever physical harm he suffered was 
caused by the negligence of the defendant doctor. That 
type of instruction is patently contrary to justice, 
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legislative intent, the better reasoned trend of authority 1 Cl, 
in points I B and C herein, and common sense. 
Such instructions as the court gave tell an injured 
patient that he had a physical injury or harm but before he 
had a reasonable opportunity to know that his treating phy-
sician had negligently caused that physical injury or harm, 
his ~ight to recourse had expired. This Court should not 
burden this plaintiff and future plaintiffs so heavily. 
This matter should be reversed and remanded for a 
new trial on that issue alone. However, the trial court 
comrni tted further error in not granting plaintiff's Motion 
for Directed Verdict on the issue of the applicable limitation 
of actions section of the Utah Code Ann. i.e. § 78-4-14 (supp. 
The evidence cited previously in Point I D clearly demonstrate 
the defendant did not provide substantive evidence that 
plaintiff knew or should have known more than two years prior 
to filing his complaint that: he had suffered any physical 
injury to his kidneys; the defendant doctor had not informed r.: 
of the experimental nature of the operation; the doctor had 
not informed him of the pre-existing kidney damage that was a 
contraindication for the bypass surgery; the plaintiff didn't 
have the right to rely on the assurances of his treating 
physician that he was progressing well and any problems hemij 
have been having were the natural anticipated after effec~~ 
such surgery that would stabilize; or the defendant doctor 
had invaded any legally protected right of plaintiff. 
Defendant's own testimony as cited hereinbefore unassailab~ 
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supports simply that he failed in his burden on the affirmative 
defense of the statute of limitations. On remand that issue 
should not be presented to the jury. 
Other compelling reasons, as shown by the record cited 
hereinbefore, demand that this case be remanded for a new 
trial on the issues of medical causation and damages only. 
The defendant's testimony without reasonable qualification is 
that the operation performed on plaintiff was experimental 
in nature and that he never told plaintiff of that fact. 
Defendant also did not tell the plaintiff that he had a pre-
existing kidney condition that would be important to consider 
in this type of operation and would or could complicate his 
post-operative care. No evidence was provided to refute 
plaintiff's testimony that he wouldn't have agreed to the 
operation if he had known the detail of his pre-existing 
kidney problems and/or that the operation itself was 
experimental. Those issues should not have been presented to 
the jury. 
Though the informed consent issues should not have 
been presented to the jury, the trial court further compounded 
its error by improperly and incorrectly instructing the jury. 
The standard the trial court used was incorrect. The instructions 
were also inconsistent. (R. 154, 155) The first such instruction 
imposes a duty to inform concerning subjects which the physician 
knows or has reason to know present risks or uncertainties, 
while the second limits that duty by excusing failure to inform 
of known risks or uncertainties ~f the "accepted medical practice" 
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would have been to withold such information. The medical 
standard of care defines what the physician should know, b~ 
the legal duty to reveal that information, especially in an 
elective procedure, should not be restricted or modified by 
any prevailing practice of not disclosing risks, or uncertaint. 
of which they are required to be aware. The patient is 
entitled to all such information and the decision to proceed 
is his and his alone, not that of the doctor who does not 
give a full disclosure and thereby makes that decision for 
his patient. 
It is a case of first impression before this court 
and few courts have been confronted with informed consent in 
an experimental procedure. The proper standard in such 
circumstances should be that the doctor, in failing to adviu: 
the procedure and the incumbent uncertain results, should 
be liable for whatever physical injury results that was 
unknown at the time of the operation due to its experimental 
nature. Such is the case at bar regarding the plaintiff's 
kidney failure. 
Finally, the trial court committed prejudicial 
error in failing to submit to the jury Plaintiff's Instructior 
9, 10, and 13 defining "same or similar communities" standard 
as national in scope. The evidence in this case was that 
board certified surgeons such as defendant are governed by 
national boards and standards. Therefore, the trial court 
was incorrect in leaving to the jury a determination of 
whether the standard was national in scope as well as what 
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the standard was and whether or not the defendant breached 
that standard. In so doing, the court improperly allowed the 
jury to disregard the testimony of plaintiff's two main 
medical authorities simply on the basis that one of them came 
from New York City and the other from San Diego, California. 
That is patently contrary to the purport of the Swan case supra. 
This case should be reversed and remanded for a new 
trial with the issues of the statute of limitations and/or 
negligent failure to obtain informed consent resolved in 
plaintiff's favor as a matter of law. In the alternative, 
this matter should be remanded for a new trial with the jury 
to be properly instructed on the issues. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /} day 
BLACK & MOORE 
Of S¥.4-., / I (j .:] 1979. 
. V/f(.~~~ ~~-
M. DAVID ECKERSLEY 
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the foregoing BriW:o John Snow and Elliot Williams, 
counsel for defendants, 700 Continental Bank Building, 
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